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Power to the People: How the SEC
Can Empower the Crowd
ABSTRACT

Crowdfunding emerged as a heralded capital-formation
mechanism at a time when capital markets desperately need it, but is it
actually viable? Following passage of the JOBS Act and issuance of
proposed rules by the SEC, equity crowdfunding will soon become
reality. When signing the JOBS Act, President Obama touted it as a
means "to increase American job creation and economic growth," but
that will only hold true for Title III, Crowdfunding, if the SEC creates
an attractive market for high-quality projects. The SEC's proposed
rules impose a heavy disclosure burden relative to a low maximum
offering amount, offering a poor value proposition to aspiring
entrepreneurs. Consequently, the proposed crowdfunding market is
more likely to attract low quality projects that cannot find funding
elsewhere.
This Note contends that reducing disclosure requirements,
allowing portals greater discretion to screen projects, and facilitating
active crowd participationin selecting high-quality investments would
be more consistent with the aims of both the JOBS Act, in particular,
and securities regulation, in general. This Note recommends the
Commission initially adopt a light regulatory approach,let the market
regulate itself where practicable, and impose harsher regulation only
where necessary.
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In 1886, the renowned journalist and press baron Joseph
Pulitzer ran an advertisement in his newspaper soliciting donations to
help build a pedestal for the newly constructed Statue of Liberty.1
Pulitzer promised donors a six-inch replica statuette in exchange for
$1 or a twelve-inch version for $5.2 Over six months, individuals
4
donated nearly $100,000, 3 with the majority of donations under $1.
Some 120 years later, a revolutionary high-volume, low-amount,
5
donation-based capital market emerged-crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding is an online marketplace (portal) that connects
aspiring entrepreneurs, who possess a great idea but no money, with a
large audience of Internet users (the crowd), whom these companies
hope will each contribute a small amount.6 Crowdfunding has the
potential to infuse previously inaccessible capital into our sputtering
economy because it connects companies that otherwise could not
7
arrange funding with individuals who otherwise would not invest.
Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act carved
out an exemption from securities registration for crowdfunded

1.
See The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?, MASSOLUTION
http://events.massolution.com/the-jobs-act-economic-boon-or-peril.
2.

(Aug. 14, 2013),

Id.

3.
The equivalent of $2.4 million today. Id.
4.
Id.; see also Julie Blair Pitts, Pulitzer Crowdfunded the Statue of Liberty?, DAILY
CROWDSOURCE,
http://dailycrowdsource.com/content/crowdfunding/169-pulitzer-crowdfundedthe-statue-of-liberty (last visited Dec. 28, 2013) ('The most incredible aspect of his campaign is
that the over 120,000 donations were in most cases less than a dollar.").
5.
See The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?,supra note 1.
6.
Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011).
7.
Id. at 931-32. This Note will focus solely on the crowdfunding market in the United
States, though advanced crowdfunding markets exist in many countries (e.g., the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and Germany). See Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Equity Crowdfunding,
10-11 (Dec. 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2362340.
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offerings, thereby creating an equity-based crowdfunding market. 8
This revolutionary market would, if viable, reduce businesses'
dependence on large institutions to arrange financing, while
simultaneously offering promising investments to the public that were
previously available only to the wealthy. 9
Despite crowdfunding's promise, the Securities & Exchange
Commission's (SEC or Commission) proposed regulations seek to
create a market that offers perhaps the worst value proposition of any
capital formation mechanism available to small businesses. 10 The
final regulations can further the primary goals of securities regulation
by increasing access to capital for small businesses while protecting
the interests of investors. 1 Crowdfunding's radical nature poses yet
unanswered questions, which will require innovative regulation.1 2
Using its broad statutory authorization, the Commission should adopt
a trial-and-error approach to striking the appropriate balance, using a
light regulatory touch initially and imposing harsher regulation only
where necessary. 13 I propose that the final regulations should reduce
the amount of disclosure to a level commensurate with the nature of
crowdfunded companies, empower portals to police offerings, and
facilitate full communication between members of the crowd.1 4
This Note analyzes how the SEC's crowdfunding rules could
satisfy the aims of securities regulation. 15
Part I explores the
economic environment that gave rise to the JOBS Act, provides a brief
overview of crowdfunding's role within the overall securities market,
and discusses the salient features of the SEC's proposed regulations,

8.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301 et seq.,
126 Stat. 306, 315-23 (2012).
9.
Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking under the
CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. (EN BANC) 43, 44-45 (2013).

10.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249); Zachary J. Gubler, Inventive Funding Deserves
Creative Regulation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323468604578251913868617572; The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?,
supranote 1.
11.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431 ("Upon adoption of final rules, the
Commission staff will monitor the market for offerings made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6),
focusing in particular on the types of issuers using the exemption . . . and whether the
exemption is promoting new capital formation while at the same time providing key protections
for investors.").
12.
See Steven M. Davidoff, Trepidation and Restrictions Leave Crowdfunding Rules
Weak, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/
trepidation-and-restrictions -leave -crowdfunding-rules -weak.
13.
See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 55 (proposing that the SEC should wait
to see how crowdfunding works in practice before tacking on additional rules).
14.
See infra Part III.
15.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,428.
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noting where they deviate from the JOBS Act. 16 Part II analyzes
these proposed regulations to assess whether the disclosure
requirements, the crowdfunding community (the crowd), and the
unique function of portals are sufficient fraud safeguards, thereby
allowing crowdfunding to fulfill its potential as a viable securities
market. 17 Part III outlines the original purpose of the crowdfunding
exemption and suggests an alternative crowdfunding framework more
consistent with these goals.1 8 This Note ultimately recommends a
statutory framework that reduces issuers' disclosure burden, yet still
provides investors with adequate protection via portals' screening
efforts and the active participation of the crowdfunding community in
selecting quality investments.' 9
I. SETTING THE STAGE

Crowdfunding's success in a nonequity setting flourished
largely in the absence of regulation, but the paucity of capital
20
available to entrepreneurs necessitated an equity-based market.
The factors that motivated this radical market and the evolution of
the resultant legislation are discussed below.
A. For the People,By the People
Crowdfunding is broadly defined as "efforts by entrepreneurial
individuals and groups--cultural, social, and for-profit-to fund their
ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a
relatively large number of individuals using the internet [sic], without
standard financial intermediaries." 21 In its original format, known as
donation- or rewards-based crowdfunding, individuals donate a set
amount of money in exchange for a prespecified reward, such as a copy
of the finished product (i.e., a CD, movie, widget, etc.) or a chance to

16.
See infra Part I.
17.
See infra Part II.
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
See infra Part II.C.
20.
See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 197 (2012).
Ethan R. Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding:An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus.
21.
VENTURING 1, 2 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088298. Crowdfunding borrows
heavily from the concept of crowdsourcing, which involves companies drawing small labor
contributions from a large number of individuals on the Internet to alter their production
structure. See generally Erin R. Frankrone, Note, Free Agents: Should Crowdsourcing Lead to
Agency Liability for Firms?, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 883 (2013) (noting the prevalence of
crowdsourcing as a viable means for accumulating resources).

2014]

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

949

Kickstarter, the preeminent
attend a live-recording session. 22
crowdfunding portal, demonstrates the power of this business model,
having successfully raised over $1.06 billion for almost 60,000 projects
since its inception in 2009.23
Over the past few years, crowdfunding has generated
significant organic momentum through the rise of websites like
Kickstarter and Indiegogo. 24 The crowdfunding market doubled in
size in the last year alone and has become an attractive financing
option for a myriad of small businesses and start-ups seeking
capital. 25 Start-ups ranging from a Bluetooth-enabled wristwatch
manufacturer 26 to a New York crab shack 27 have found great success
funding their ventures mimicking Pulitzer's model. 28 Music and film
productions, in particular, are well suited for donation-based
crowdfunding because investors will accept nonmonetary returns on
their donation, such as satisfaction from contributing to an
entrepreneurial initiative, early access to the product, or an
29
opportunity to meet the creator.

22.
Ajay K. Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding 12 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19133, 2013), available at http://www.nber.orgl
papers/w19133.
23.
Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited
Apr. 10, 2014).
24.
See KICKSTARTER, www.kickstarter.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2014); INDIEGOGO,
www.indiegogo.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
Crowdfunding volumes in North America grew 108 percent to $1.6 billion in 2012.
25.
Crowdfunding Market Grows 81% in 2012: CrowdfundingPlatforms Raise $2.7 Billion and Fund
More Than One Million Campaigns, Finds Research Firm Massolution, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 8,
2013, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/crowdfunding-market-grows-81-in20 12-crowdfunding-platforms -raise-27-billion-and-fund-more -than-one- million-campaigns-findsresearch-firm-massolution-201911701.html.
Mark Nowotarski, Getting Your Invention off of the Ground with Crowdfunding,
26.
IPWATCHDOG (June 29, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/29/getting-yourinvention-off-of-the-ground-with-crowdfunding (documenting the story of the Pebble smartwatch,
the most successful Kickstarter project to date, which raised over $10 million).
27.
Littleneck - A Clam Shack Coming Soon to Gowanus!, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/littleneck/littleneck-a-clam-shack-coming-soon-to-gowanus
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
28.
See The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?,supra note 1.
29.
See, e.g., Agrawal et al., supra note 22; Thaya Brook Knight et al., A Very Quiet
Revolution: A Primer on Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J.
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 135, 136 (2012) (discussing the disproportionate success of
projects exhibiting a sufficient 'cool factor'); Crowdfunding Market Grows, supra note 25
(documenting how Performing Arts (11.9 percent) and Music & Recording Arts (7.5 percent)
projects account for a large percentage of total crowdfunded ventures); Perry Chen, Yancey
Strickler, & Charles Adler, The Truth About Spike Lee and Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Aug.
19, 2013), http://www.kickstarter.comlblog/the-truth-about-spike-lee-and-kickstarter-O (citing the
success of Veronica Mars, Zach Braff, and Spike Lee as crowdfunding creators).
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As crowdfunding gains prominence, entrepreneurs grow
For
increasingly creative in utilizing this investment model. 30
example, one start-up recently attempted to raise $300 million to
purchase the Pabst Brewing Company by promising an amount of beer
proportionate to the investment and a "crowdsourced certificate of
organization
Similarly,
the
human-rights
ownership." 31
AHUMANRIGHT is currently accepting donations to launch a
communications satellite into orbit that would provide Internet access
to third-world countries.3 2 Other portals arrange peer-to-peer lending
33
markets, matching borrowers and lenders with similar risk profiles.
Despite this burgeoning market, small businesses' demand for
capital far outweighs supply in the United States. 34 The demand for
new investment is estimated to be around $13 trillion over the course
of the next decade.3 5 In 2011, approximately 600,000 small businesses
reported being entirely shut-off from credit, with an additional
800,000 obtaining less than they desired. 36 Yet, 58 percent of all
American adults maintain that they are willing to help fund a start-up

Even President Obama utilized crowdfunding to raise over $100 million in small
30.
contributions during the 2008 presidential election. See Ahlers et al., supra note 7, at 10-11.
Mature companies are similarly pursuing this capital, as evidenced by DodgeDartRegistry.com,
where an entrepreneurial youth can virtually assemble a replica of his/her dream Dodge Dart
and then solicit donations from friends and family to pay for parts or features of the car. DODGE
DART REGISTRY, www.dodgedartregistry.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
31.
See Matthew Hutchens, Hitting the Target: How New Disclosure Rules Could
Improve the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 3-4 (Sept. 27, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332248. Alas, after a promising start saw the
venture raise over $200 million from five million discrete investors, the SEC shut down the
campaign for failure to register as an offering of securities. Id. At the time, no securities
exemption permitted crowdfunded ventures to offer an ownership stake without registering with
the SEC, which the certificate of ownership violated. See id. at 4; Bill Singer, SEC Skunks Pabst
BuyaBeerCompany Deal, FORBES BLOG (June 8, 2011, 3:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
siteslbillsinger/201 1/06/08/sec-skunks-pabst-buyabeercompany-deal.
32.
See BUY THIS SATELLITE, http://www.buythissatellite.com (last visited Oct. 30,
2013).
33.
These loans can assume an altruistic structure (i.e., requiring the borrower to repay
only the principal amount without interest) or an investment structure (i.e., requiring repayment
of principal plus interest). Compare KIVA, www.kiva.com (arranging altruistic, nonprofit loans
starting as low as $25 with the goal of alleviating poverty) (last visited Apr. 10, 2014), with
PROSPER, www.prosper.com (offering loans with annual percentage rates ranging from
6.25-35.36 percent) (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
34.
See Paul White, Comments on SEC Regulatory Initiatives under the JOBS Act: Title
III - Crowdfunding, SEC.GOv (July 22, 2013), http:l/www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-titleiii/jobstitleiii-248.pdf.
35.
See id.
36.

NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus., RESEARCH FOUNDATION, SMALL BUSINESS, CREDIT

ACCESS, AND A LINGERING RECESSION 30 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.nfib.comIPortals/
OPDF/AllUsersresearchstudieslsmall-business-credit-study-nfib-2012.pdf.
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or expanding small business in pursuit of the American Dream. 3 7
Crowdfunding has the potential to remedy this market inefficiency
because it connects entrepreneurs who could not otherwise arrange
financing with public investors who would not otherwise invest in
startups. 3 One estimate projects a $300 billion infusion of capital into
the economy if Americans move just 1 percent of their investable
assets into crowdfunding.3 9 But funders require financial returns on
their investment to invest in large enough quantities to satiate the
demand for capital, which would bring the transactions under the
40
purview of securities regulation.
B. Crowdfunding Investments as Securities
Prior to the JOBS Act, crowdfunding operated in the absence of
government regulation. Though the crowdfunding market was not
regulated, it was initially unclear if some of these companies were
actually offering securities, which would require compliance with
extensive registration requirements before selling these financial
interests. 41 Then, the Commission issued cease-and-desist orders to a
number of issuers, thereby establishing limits on nonequity
crowdfunding. 42 This left entrepreneurs searching for a method to
access the vast amount of untapped capital while avoiding the

37.
See White, supra note 34 (noting that the average crowdfunding investment is
$1300 and 69 percent of investors earning greater than $75,000 per year would be willing to
invest an average of $1,900 per year).
38.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 196.
39.
Raising Capital Online: The New Thundering Herd, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21556973 (quoting venture capitalist Fred Wilson).
40.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 197.
41.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining the term "security" for the purposes of the
Securities Act of 1933 to include investment contract). An investment contract is
[A] contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the
enterprise.
S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (interpreting the meaning of "investment
contract" in the Securities Act).
42.
See Zachary Griffin, Crowdfunding."Fleecing the American Masses, CASE W. RES.
J.L., TECH. & INTERNET (unpublished note), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030001
(detailing the trials and tribulations of ProFounder.com); see also Mikal E. Belicove, Ohio
Investigating Crowdfunding Platform SoMoLend, FORBES BLOG (Aug. 13, 2013, 7:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikalbelicove/2013/08/13/ohio-investigating-crowdfunding-platformsomolend (describing how Ohio security regulators shut down SoMoLend, a portal connecting
borrowers with lenders, for securities fraud); Singer, supra note 31 (recounting the valiant
attempt to crowdfund the purchase of the Pabst Brewing Company).
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extensive disclosure requirements for reporting companies, which
43
would render the cost of an offering prohibitive.
But equity-based crowdfunding clearly fits within the classic
definition of an investment contract. 44 Consequently, these offerings
are subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act) absent an applicable exemption. 45 No existing
exemption applied to crowdfunded companies until the JOBS Act
4
created one. 6
C. The JOBS Act and Proposed SEC Regulations
In response to the pent-up demand for start-up capital in a
post-recession economy and the lack of a market mechanism to
facilitate it, Congress introduced the JOBS Act, which President
Obama signed into law on April 5, 2012.47 The JOBS Act is intended
"to increase American job creation and economic growth by improving
access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies." 4
The legislation is an agglomeration of bills that collectively seek to
improve small businesses' access to capital. 49 Specifically, Title III
adds Section 4(a)(6) to the Securities Act, creating an exemption from
the registration requirements of Securities Act Section 5 for
equity-based crowdfunded offerings. 50 The legislation, when it takes
effect,5 1 will permit issuers to offer a financial interest in their
business, either debt or equity, in exchange for a set investment of
money.52
43.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 196-97.
44.
See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (2012) (noting that the statutory term "investment
contract" is broadly construed to encompass any fundraising effort that expressly or impliedly
offers investors a potential return on their investment, including notes and indebtedness).
45.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 196.
46.
Id. at 196-97.
47.
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101 et
seq., 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Press Release, Office of the
Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing.
48.
JOBS Act § 101, 126 Stat. at 306.
49.
Title I of the JOBS Act broadens the scope of an 'emerging growth company,' see id.
§§ 101-08, while Title II relaxes the ban on general solicitation of accredited investors, see id. §
201.
50.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429-30 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249).
51.
After accepting comments on the proposed regulations the SEC must promulgate
final regulations and provide FINRA sufficient time to structure a market framework. See David
Drake, Why Equity Crowdfunding Won't Happen This Year, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2013, 10:22
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/02/19/why-equity-crowdfunding-wont-happenthis-year.
52.
See Bradford, supranote 20, at 197.
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While the JOBS Act outlines crowdfunding's general regulatory
framework, the SEC must promulgate final regulations. 5 3
Consequently, the Commission assumed the daunting task of
implementing rules for the crowdfunding market that strike the
proper balance between the two primary tenets of securities
regulation: (1) improving access to capital and (2) protecting the
interests of investors. 54 On November 5, 2013, the SEC issued its
proposed rules, starting the clock on a ninety-day comment period,
55
after which it will promulgate final regulations.
1. Concerning Issuers
Consistent with the text of the JOBS Act, the Commission
proposes to cap the maximum amount of crowdfunded securities any
issuer may offer at $1 million in any twelve-month period. 56 Further,
it establishes three tiers of offerings, each carrying varying levels of
disclosure, identical to those proposed by the JOBS Act. 57 Prior to
offering crowdfunded securities, an issuer with a target objective of
$100,000 or less must submit tax returns from the previous fiscal year
(if any) and unaudited financial statements. 58 For target offerings
greater than $100,000 but less than $500,000, an issuer is required to
submit financial statements certified by an independent public
accountant. 59 For any offering above $500,000 to the $1 million
ceiling, issuers must submit audited financial statements. 60
In
addition, all issuers must provide a narrative discussion of their
financial condition, similar to a Management Discussion & Analysis
(MD&A) for reporting companies, which addresses the historical
results of the issuer's operations and, to the extent material, its
liquidity and capital resources.6 1 For issuers without a prior operating

53.
The Blunderbuss Clause requires issuers to comply with "such other requirements
as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe, for the protection of investors and in the public
interest." JOBS Act § 302, 126 Stat. at 317.
54.
See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
55.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,428.
56.
The SEC took great care to explain that capital raised via other means (e.g.,
Regulation D exemption) should not be counted in determining aggregate amount sold in any
given twelve-month period. See id. at 66,431.
57.
See JOBS Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b) (2012).
58.
Id. § 77d-l(b)(1)(D)(i).
59.
Id. § 77d-l(b)(1)(D)(ii).
60.
Id. § 77d-l(b)(1)(D)(iii).
61.
For issuers with prior operating history, discussion should focus on "whether
historical earnings and cash flows are representative of what investors should expect in the
future." Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,444. Further the Commission recognizes that
companies utilizing the Crowdfunding exemption are unlikely to be as large and complex as
traditional reporting companies, thus the discussion of their financial condition will generally
not be as detailed and lengthy as a MD&A. See id.
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history, the narrative can be prospective, focusing on 6 financial
2
milestones and the various risks associated with the venture.
The proposed rules would not prohibit issuers from accepting
investments in excess of the target-offering amount, capped at the $1
million maximum, provided they have exceeded the target before a
prespecified deadline.6 3 If an offeror elects to accept investments in
excess of the target-offering amount, however, then it must disclose
how much it is willing to accept, how the excess funds will be
allocated, and the intended purpose for the additional funds. 64 To
determine the requisite degree of financial disclosure, an issuer must
aggregate all crowdfunding proceeds raised in the preceding
twelve-month period with the target-offering amount, including the
65
maximum oversubscription it is willing to accept.
In addition to these basic financial disclosures, issuers are
subject to more extensive disclosure requirements intended to provide
investors with sufficient information to form an educated opinion
regarding the quality of investment. 66 These include, inter alia: the
public price of the securities or a method for determining the price, a
description of the issuer's ownership and capital structure, a
description of the material terms of any indebtedness of the issuer, a
description of exempt offerings conducted within the past three years,
and material transactions.6 7 Finally, issuers are required to provide
regular updates on their progress towards the target-offering
amount. 68 The JOBS Act listed the requisite general information that
issuers must submit prior to issuance of securities, though it did not
mandate the format for conveying this information to investors. 69 The
proposed rules specify that the mandated disclosures must be

62.
If an issuer does not have a prior operating history, discussion should focus on
"financial milestones and operational, liquidity and other challenges." Id.
63.
See id. at 66,457-58.
64.
Id. at 66,440.
65.
For example, if an issuer sets their target at $450,000 but elects to accept
investment up to a maximum of $750,000, then they must submit audited financial statements.
See id. at 66,445.
Id. at 66,522.
66.
67.
The following information is also among the required disclosures: name, legal
status, physical and website address of the business; pertinent information regarding directors
and officers, as well as beneficial owners (i.e. persons owning 20 percent or more outstanding
voting equity); a description of the business and anticipated business plan; stated purpose and
intended use of the proceeds; a discussion of the material factors that make the investment
speculative or risky; a description of the process to complete the transaction or cancel an
investment commitment; the amount of compensation paid to the intermediary. Id. at 66,438.
68.
Id.
"We recognize that there are numerous ways to achieve that goal and, as such, we
69.
are not proposing to mandate a specific disclosure format." Id.
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submitted on the SEC's Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval (EDGAR) database using Form C.70
71
But the disclosure requirements for issuers do not end there.
Under the proposed rules, an issuer would be subject to ongoing
reporting requirements similar to the information required in the
offering statement, including information about its financial
condition. 72 Companies must file these reports annually until one of
three events occurs:
(1) The issuer becomes a reporting company required to file reports under the Exchange
Act of 1934; (2) the issuer or another party purchases or repurchases all of the
securities ... including any payment in full of debt securities or any complete
redemption of redeemable securities; or (3) the issuer liquidates or dissolves its business
73
in accordance with state law.

Any issuer who does not comply with these ongoing reporting
requirements is excluded from offering crowdfunded securities until it
74
files the two most recent annual reports.
The proposed rules prohibit the following categories of issuers
from using Section 4(a)(6) to issue securities: 75 (1) non-US issuers; (2)
reporting companies; (3) investment companies; (4) issuers that are
disqualified pursuant to the disqualification provisions of Section
302(d) of the JOBS Act; (5) issuers who have not complied with annual
ongoing reporting requirements; and (6) issuers lacking a specific
business plan or whose business plan is to engage in a merger or
acquisition with unidentified company. 76
The JOBS Act text held issuers liable for material
misstatements and omissions, without including a scienter element. 77
The proposed regulations then added a 'substantial compliance'
provision, similar to Rule 508 of Regulation D, to protect
unsophisticated investors from liability for merely negligent
omissions.7 8 This provision shields issuers from liability if a material
omission or misrepresentation is "not misleading, provided that the
70.
Form C is flexible, requiring the submission of certain disclosures in a specified
format, while allowing issuers to format the remaining disclosures according to their preferences.
Id. at 66,449. EDGAR is the online filings database of the SEC and is available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
71.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,450-52 (discussing the ongoing reporting
requirements).
72.
Id. at 66,451.
73.
Id. These reports must be filed on EDGAR no later than one hundred and twenty
days after the close of the most recent fiscal year covered by the report. Id.
74.
Id. at 66,437 (discussing the exclusion of certain issuers from eligibility under
Section 4(a)(6)).
75.
Id. at 66,436.
76.
Id.
77.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 4A(c), 126
Stat. 306 (2012).
78.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 219 (citing Securities Act of 1933, § 4A(c)(2)(A)-(B)).
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purchaser did not know of the untruth or omission, and the issuer
does not sustain the burden of proof that such issuer did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission. 7 9
2. Concerning Investors
The proposed rules contain the same bifurcated investor
classes the JOBS ACT suggested,80 but clarify potential ambiguity
regarding the annual investment limitation.8 1 Any investor whose
annual income and net worth are each less than $100,000 is limited to
an aggregate crowdfunding investment of $2,000 or 5 percent of
annual income or net worth, whichever is greater, in any given
twelve-month period.8 2 If either annual income or net worth exceeds
$100,000, then the aggregate investment is limited to 10 percent of
the greater of annual income or net worth, not to exceed $100,000 in
any given twelve-month period.8 3 Issuers are permitted to rely on an
intermediary's representation that an investment will not cause an
investor to exceed their limitation for the preceding twelve-month
84
period.

79.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,499; see also id. at 66,499 n.745 ('The anti-fraud
and civil liability provisions of the Securities Act, such as Sections 12(a)(2) and 17, apply to
exempted transactions."). Under this liability provision, an investor who purchases securities in
a crowdfunding transaction may bring an action against the issuer to recover the consideration
paid for the security, with interest, or damages if the person no longer holds the security. See id.
at 66,499.
80.
Compare JOBS Act § 302(a)(6)(B), with Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431-32.
81.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,433. The proposed rules observe:
Several commenters noted that Sections 4(a)(6)(B)(i) and (ii) technically subject some
investors to two potential investment limits. The language of the statute may be read
to create potential conflicts or ambiguity between the two investment limits because
paragraph (i) applies if "either" annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 and
paragraph (ii) applies if "either" annual income or net worth is equal to or more than
$100,000....
We believe that the appropriate approach is to the investment limit provision is to
provide for an overall investment limit of $100,000, but within that overall limit, to
provide for a "greater of' limitation based on annual income and net worth.
Id.
82.
Annual income and net worth are calculated in accordance with the Commission's
rules for determining accredited investor status. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013). Consistent
with these rules, the calculation of a natural person's net worth for purposes of the investment
limit would exclude the value of the primary residence of such person. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a)(5)(i)(B). A natural person's income for purposes of the investment limit calculation
would be the lower of such person's income for each of the two most recent years as long as such
person has a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a)(6).
83.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430.
84.
The standard of liability is "reasonable belief' meaning that if the issuer has
knowledge the investor has, or would, exceed their limit they may not rely on an intermediary's
contrary representation. Id. at 66,432.
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3. Concerning Portals
The JOBS Act created a unique class of financial
intermediaries, called portals, specifically designed to facilitate
crowdfunded transactions.8 5 The proposed rules define a portal as "an
Internet website or other similar electronic medium through which a
registered broker or a registered funding portal acts as an
intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities
in reliance on Section 4(a)(6)."8 6 The Commission intends to limit an
issuer to one portal for any given issuance of crowdfunded securities.8 7
Unlike traditional broker-dealer intermediaries, crowdfunding portals
88
cannot offer investment advice or recommendations to investors.
Portals are additionally prohibited from offering compensation to
"promoters, finders, or lead generators for providing the broker or
funding portal with the personal identifying information of any
potential investor."8 9 Further, executives and other key employees of
the portal may not have any financial interest in an issuer using its
portal to solicit funds. 90 Finally, portals must "register with any
applicable self-regulatory organization,"9 1 as well as be a member of a
national securities association that is registered with the
92
Commission.

II. ALL BARK, No BITE
Since President Obama signed the JOBS Act into law in April
2012 it has been the subject of intense scrutiny. 93 Proponents hail it
85.
Portals, as well as existing broker/dealers, are the exclusive intermediaries for
crowdfunded transactions. See JOBS Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (referring to §4A of the
Securities Act of 1933).
86.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,435 ("The proposed rules would accommodate
other electronic media that currently exist or may develop in the future. For instance,
applications for mobile communication devices, such as cell phones or smart phones, could be
used to display offerings and to permit investors to make investment commitments.").
87.
See id.
88.
See id. at 66,458.
89.
Id. at 66,476 (citing Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act).
90.
See JOBS Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(a)(11) (2012) (referring to § 4A(a)(11) of
Securities Act of 1933) ("[P]rohibit its directors, officers, or partners (or any person occupying a
similar status or performing a similar function) from having any financial interest in an issuer
using its services.").
91.
Id. § 77d-1(a)(2) (referring to § 4A(a)(2) of Securities Act of 1933).
92.
The statute requires registration with a self-regulatory organization as defined by
§3(a)(80) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. At the time of publication, only FINRA satisfies
this requirement. See Knight, supra note 29, at 147 n.44.
93.
See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, Success of Crowdfunding Puts Pressureon Entrepreneurs,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/technology/success-ofcrowdfunding-puts-pressure-on-entrepreneurs.html
('"The honeymoon period that we are
experiencing around crowdfunding is beginning to come to a close,' said Wil Schroter, co-founder
and chief executive of Fundable ....
'People realize there is real risk involved in investing in
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as a disruptive securities market,9 4 with the ability to facilitate access
to a vast store of capital that traditional investment instruments
cannot reach. 95 The legislators who championed the JOBS Act in
Congress realized crowdfunding's disruptive potential: "There is now
the ability to use the Internet as a way for small investors to get the
same kind of deals that up to this point only select investors have
gotten... ,"96 Many journalists and other commentators following the
crowdfunding phenomenon agreed.9 7 Conversely, a number of critics
98
decried the legislation as creating a market for fraud.
Mary Schapiro, then-Chairperson of the SEC, initially adopted
a cynical stance on the JOBS Act;9 9 that attitude permeates the
anything early-stage, whether it's an idea, a charity or a product, and they're starting to
understand they aren't buying off of Amazon.'").
See Erick Schonfeld, 33Needs Brings Crowdsourced Funding to Social Startups,
94.
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/201/01/31/33needs ("It's a launching pad
that builds fans, breeds a loyal base of people who'll buy your stuff and use your product. There
is so much pent up demand to invest in this stuff-not donate, but invest.").
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 47.
95.
Right now, [start-ups and small businesses] can only turn to a limited group of
investors - including banks and wealthy individuals - to get funding. Laws that are
nearly eight decades old make it impossible for others to invest. But a lot has changed
in 80 years, and it's time our laws did as well. Because of [the CROWDFUND Act],
start-ups and small business will now have access to a big, new pool of potential
investors - namely, the American people. For the first time, ordinary Americans will
be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.
Id.
96.
158 CONG. REC. 81689 (daily ed. March 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mark Warner);
see also 158 CONG. REC. S1717 (daily ed. March 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu)
("[Tihis crowdfunding bill . . . is, in essence, a way for the Internet to be used to raise
capital ....
").
97.
See, e.g., Gubler, supra note 10 ("Crowdfunding has the potential to revolutionize
the financing of small business, transforming millions of users of social media such as Facebook
into overnight venture capitalists, and giving life to valuable business ideas that might otherwise
go unfunded."); see also The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?, supra note 1 (positing that the
ultimate goal of the JOBS Act is to improve the start-up economy by lowering the threshold to
participation, thus allowing more companies to fail faster).
See, e.g., Dave Michaels, SEC to Issue Crowdfunding Proposal Easing Investor
98.
Verification, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2013-10-17fsec-to-release-crowdfunding-rule-easing-investor-verification ("What we are talking
about are companies that in all likelihood are not going to be winners, and they are being
invested in by people who clearly don't have the expertise and financial smarts of venture
capitalists ....So you put those together and you are creating a real opportunity for scams and
fraud and significant losses." (quoting Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant of the SEC)); The
(Apr.
5,
2012),
Fails Investors and Entrepreneurs, NASAA.ORG
JOBS Act
("Congress has just
http:l/www.nasaa.org/12092/the-jobs-act-fails-investors-and-entrepreneurs
released every huckster, scam artist, and small business owner and salesman onto the internet."
(quoting Jack Herstein, North American Securities Administrator's Association President)); The
JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?,supra note 1 ("At best, this bill could make it easier for con
artists to defraud seniors out of their entire life savings by convincing them to invest in
worthless companies. At worst, this bill has the potential to create the next Enron or Arthur
Andersen scandal or an even worse financial crisis." (quoting Sen. Bernie Sanders)).
99.
See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Jobs Act Could Remove Investor Protections, SEC
Chair Mary Schapiro Warns, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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proposed regulations. 10 0 If the proposed regulations are adopted
verbatim, the crowdfunding market would arguably become the least
efficient means of capital formation-a far cry from the disruptive
model that champions praised. 0 1 These unimaginative regulations
fuel speculation that the Commission is hesitant to innovate in light of
recent court decisions that require statistical proof to justify
Commission actions. 10 2 But crowdfunding cannot realize its potential
to unlock vast stores of capital unless the Commission structures an
efficient market such that issuers receive a fair price for their
03
equity.
It is imperative that the entirety of industry regulations and
practices jointly crafted by the Commission and portals do not inhibit
the crowdfunding market from operating efficiently.104
The
equity-based crowdfunding market generated $116 million in
international transactions in 2012, but the market is projected to grow
to over $5 billion following the implementation of the crowdfunding
exemption in the US.105 Because this infusion of capital is crucial to
economic vitality, the Commission must strike the proper balance
between increasing access to capital while protecting the interests of
investors, which will allow crowdfunding to fulfill its potential as a
viable capital-formation mechanism. 106

business/economy/jobs-act-could-open-a-door-to-investmentfraud-secchiefsays/2012/03114/
gIQAlvxlBS-story.html ("'Too often, investors are the target of fraudulent schemes disguised as
investment opportunities,' Schapiro wrote. '[1If the balance is tipped to the point where investors
are not confident that there are appropriate protections, investors will lose confidence in our
markets, and capital formation will ultimately be made more difficult and expensive."'); Ben
Protess, Regulator Seeks Feedback on JOBS Act, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 11, 2012, 4:16 PM),
http:/dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/1 lregulator-seeks-feedback-on-jobs-act
('Mary Schapiro,
chairwoman of the S.E.C., warned last month that the law would 'weaken investor protection."').
100.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).
101.
Deborah L. Jacobs, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:41
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/secproposes-crowdfunding-rules
('The proposed rules are extremely impractical because of the restrictions and procedural
hurdles a crowdfunding issuer, investor and funding portal will have to endure to raise capital.
Compared to other forms of crowdfunding and capital raising, equity crowdfunding to the public
has the worst 'bang for your buck' in all of corporate finance.").
102.
See Davidoff, supra note 12 (claiming the Commission adopted a "bunker mentality"
after a string of adverse court decisions, resulting in a higher bar-statistical proof-to justify
SEC actions).
103.
See Agrawal et al., supranote 22, at 20-21.
104.
See id.
105.
See Crowdfunding Market Grows, supra note 25.
106.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 ('The proposed rules are intended to align
crowdfunding transactions under Section 4(a)(6) with the central tenets of the original concept of
crowdfunding, in which the public-or the crowd-is presented with an opportunity to invest in
an idea or business and individuals decide whether or not to invest after sharing information
about the idea or business with, and learning from, other members of the crowd.").
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A. A Novel Market Demands a Novel Mechanism
Balancing these two competing interests-access to capital
versus protecting the interests of investors-is especially difficult
within the crowdfunding context where there is a dearth of reliable
The typical crowdfunding
data due to the market's infancy.107
transaction involves financially unsophisticated individuals investing
in inherently risky start-ups, which are more likely to fail than the
average publicly owned company, and even less likely to become
Additionally, crowdfunding differs from traditional
profitable. 108
sources of equity in several notable respects: limited risk exposure
because of the investment cap, 10 9 the participation of the crowd in
weeding out fraudulent issuers and discerning quality investments," 0
the unique function of portals, the lack of a secondary market, voting
rights disproportionate to ownership, as well as potentially resolving
inefficiencies in the spatial allocation of capital." '
As a novel securities market, crowdfunding demands a creative
approach to securities regulation. 112 The Commission seemingly
appreciated the delicate nature of the market; 113 yet, despite
employing more investment professionals than any other executive
agency or Congress, the proposed rules contain only insignificant
114
deviations from the text of the JOBS Act.
B. Burdensome Disclosure
The proposed disclosure requirements will likely be so
burdensome that they frustrate the JOBS Act's mission to increase
See Gubler, supra note 10.
107.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 196; see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at
108.
933 n.275 ("Census data report that 69% of new employer establishments born to new firms in
2000 survived at least 2 years, and 51% survived 5 or more years."); FAQ, NAT'L VENTURE CAP.
AS'N, http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147 (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (stating that 40
percent of venture capital investments fail, 40 percent return moderate amounts of capital, and
only 20 percent or less produce high returns).
109.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 50.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 219.
110.
111.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 35 (predicting that the online setting where
crowdfunding is conducted will reduce the importance of factors that influence geography bias
present in traditional funding).
112.
See Gubler, supranote 10.
113.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) ("We understand that Title III was designed to
help alleviate the funding gap and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and
Rules
small businesses in connection with raising capital in relatively low dollar amounts ....
that are unduly burdensome could discourage participation in crowdfunding. Rules that are too
permissive, however, may increase the risks for individual investors, thereby undermining the
facilitation of capital raising for startups and small businesses.").
See Davidoff, supranote 12.
114.
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access to capital and create more employment.115
The goal of
securities regulation is to balance the benefits of capital formation
against the cost of allowing the offerings, including potential investor
losses. 116 This theory operates under the assumption that investors
are adequately protected when all relevant aspects of the securities
are fully and fairly disclosed." 7 Disclosure is not focused on the
merits of the investment, but on arming potential investors with the
information necessary to make a fully informed investment
decision. 1 8 Congress carved out a crowdfunding exemption from the
Securities Act requirements in order to alleviate the burden of
compiling expensive disclosure documents for start-ups that are
typically devoid of funding. 119
Thus, a practical crowdfunding
exemption should entail meaningful disclosure sufficient to enable
investors to evaluate the merits of the securities without unduly
1 20
burdening issuers.
The proposed disclosure requirements are overly burdensome
because the expense of compliance is likely to render small offerings
infeasible. 12'
Though the Commission relaxed traditional
reporting-company disclosure, compliance with the mandated
disclosure still imposes significant up-front expenses to prepare
financial statements simply to qualify for an offering (especially
considering that the quintessential crowdfunded company will have no
capital until it closes the offering). 22 Issuers might fear incurring
these costs to make it to market, only to discover that the crowd does
not support their products; this possibility alone is likely to serve as a
powerful deterrent from using crowdfunding as opposed to other
23
exemptions.1

115.
See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) ("An Act To increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
emerging growth companies."); see also Shane M. Fleenor, Comment No. 35 to Proposed Rule on.
the JOBS Act Title III, SEC.GOV (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-titleiiiljobstitleiii-35.htm.
116.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 197-98.
117.
See Hazen, supra note 44, at 1741.
118.
Justice Brandeis said it best: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants ...
Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, available at
http://www.law.louisville.edullibrary/collectionslbrandeis/node/196.
119.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 909 (stating that the costs of disclosure
requirements associated with the filing of an Initial Public Offering can exceed $100,000).
120.
See Hazen, supra note 44, at 1767.
121.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 46.
122.
See id. at 49; see also Marielle Segarra, The JOBS Act: Crowdfundingand Emerging
Businesses, CFO (Oct. 22, 2013), http://ww2.cfo.com/growth-companies/2013/10/the-jobs-actcrowdfunding-and-emerging-businesses (estimating the cost of an adequate disclosure statement
to be between $50,000-100,000) (quoting Brian Korn, Securities Attorney, Pepper Hamilton).
123.
See infra Part II.E.
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Specifically, the audit requirement for companies seeking to
raise over $500,000 is onerous.' 24 The mere cost of an audit is likely to
cannibalize 10 percent of the total offering amount, notwithstanding
the intermediary's commission fee and the cost of compliance with
additional Form C disclosure requirements. 125 This provides an
incentive for entrepreneurs to minimize up-front costs by setting lower
target amounts, thereby leaving the company undercapitalized and
Offerings that involve a significant
more prone to failure. 126
intellectual property (IP) component face an additional deterrent, as
they must disclose sensitive information about their innovation and,
in doing so, risk another founder imitating their concept. 127 If these
fears keep otherwise-viable projects from reaching crowdfunding
portals, depriving investors of the returns on these promising projects
as a result, then the Commission will have effectively created a
1 28
stillborn securities market.
Further, it is highly probable that the disclosures will have
little effect on whether a project is ultimately funded, as the average
crowdfunding investor is unlikely to perform extensive due diligence
before making an investment decision.1 29 The investment limitation
exacerbates this concern by providing a disincentive for funders to
invest time and money researching companies relative to traditional
forms of investment involving larger capital outlays.13 0 Additionally,
crowdfunded offerings are likely too small to warrant professional

124.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 909 n.145; see also Should You Pay For
Audited Financial Statements?, BUSINESS OWNER, http://www.thebusinessowner.com/business(last visited Nov.
guidance/accounting/2009/07/should-you-pay-for-audited-financial-statements
23, 2013) (estimating audit costs for a small to mid-size company range from $7,000-50,000).
125.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427, 66,565 (proposed Jan. 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 240, and 249).
126.
See Fleenor, supra note 115.
This risk is highest during the capital raising period, before the product is actually
127.
launched. Other sources of capital allow a founder to keep their innovation secret. See Agrawal
et al., supranote 11, at 16-18.
See Richard Waters, Start-ups Seek the 'Wisdom of Crowds,' FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr.
128.
3, 2012, 7:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/clf1695c-7da8-1lel-9adc-OO144feab49a.html
("If the top 5 percent [of start-ups] avoid crowdfunding, the crowd won't make any money."
(quoting Naval Ravikant, Co-Founder, AngelList)); see also Fleenor, supra note 115 ("However, if
the SEC over-burdens issuers and/or investors, there is a very real possibility that demand for
crowdfunding will be choked off, and our small businesses will not obtain the capital they need to
grow. The capital markets are failing our small businesses, to the detriment of our underemployed citizenry. Congress recognized this failure, and passed the JOBS Act in an attempt to
rectify the situation.").
Data from consumer contracting research suggests that online disclosures are
129.
largely ignored, similar to 'Terms & Conditions.' See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 46.
130.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 11, at 20; see also Ahlers et al., supra note 7, at 1
("Small investors, who are often the primary support of start-ups, do not usually have the
capability to extensively research and assess potential investments.").
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analysis, placing the full burden of conducting due diligence on
investors.1 31 Empowering the crowd may alleviate this problem. 3 2
The annual investment limitation, as opposed to extensive
disclosure, will function as the fundamental protection for
crowdfunding investors because of the speculative information that
start-ups disclose combined with the likelihood that funders might
disregard these disclosures.1 3 3
Crowdfunding companies are
inherently risky and the online offerings raise significant fraud
concerns.13 4 Additionally, the crowd is composed of unsophisticated
investors with relatively shallow pockets.' 35 The proposed rules
account for these factors by ensuring investors cannot risk more
money than they can afford to lose. 136 This puts crowdfunding in
stark contrast to other forms of investment-such as gambling, buying
lottery tickets, or playing the stock market-where an individual can
legally risk their entire life savings. 137
Portals bear responsibility for policing the annual investment
limitation, though they can fulfill this obligation by relying on
investors' representations.1 38 This enforcement mechanism enables
individuals to invest in excess of the annual limit by misrepresenting
(either intentionally or carelessly) the extent of their total investments
across multiple platforms. 139 While this would constitute fraud by the
funder and lead some to believe these individuals are not deserving of
protection, the SEC should foreclose the possibility due to the
vulnerability and modest means of the target audience. 40
The most burdensome aspect of the proposed disclosure
requirements may ultimately prove to be issuer liability.1 41 By filing
131.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 46.
132.
See infra Part II.C.
133.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 46.
134.
See id. at 45.
135.
See id. at 50-51.
136.
See id. ("This is a structural protection against losing one's life savings to a crooked
crowdfunder."); cf. Hazen, supra note 44, at 1766 ("It also is likely to attract investors with
limited funds who cannot tolerate high investment risk, even for small amounts of money.").
137.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 51 ("This is a structural protection against losing
one's life savings to a crooked crowdfunder.").
138.
Id. at 59-60.
139.
See id. at 60.
140.
See id.; see also Faith Bautista, Comment No. 38 of Asian American Community on
SEC Proposal for Crowdfunding: Recipe for Disaster, SEC.GOV (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-38.pdf ('This ill-conceived Ponzi plan does not
even require that a startup seeking funds verify compliance with what are admittedly loose
investment limits. That is, a family that previously never earned more than $40,000 a year (with
a breadwinner that has just lost her job and is now dependent [on] food stamps) could easily
pretend that she has $250,000 in income and invest $25,000 a year. She could therefore invest
her entire 401(k) retirement in a startup where the chances of success are less than one in a
hundred.").
141.
See Segarra, supranote 122.
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annual reports, issuers assume public-offering-style liability for
misrepresentations and omissions of material information.' 42 Issuers
will surely make disclosure mistakes in a market that forces
inexperienced entrepreneurs to comply with sophisticated disclosure
requirements that implicate a detailed understanding of corporate
finance and law. 143 Wisely, the proposed rules include a substantial
compliance provision that will protect unsophisticated founders from
liability for insignificant and good faith mistakes. 144 In addition, civil
actions will not be an appropriate remedy because of the modest
damages to each funder and the likely insolvency of founders
(successful investments rarely lead to litigation). 145 Thus, some form
of cost-effective alternative dispute resolution must emerge to
146
determine the ektent of issuer liability.
C. Wisdom of the Crowd
Numerous commentators have emphasized crowdfunding's
potential to induce fraudulent activity. 147 Studies conducted on
rewards-based crowdfunding suggest that prior funding decisions of
project backers exert considerable influence on the subsequent
funding decisions of other backers. 48 This irrational herding behavior
attracts fraudulent issuers, as founders might initially invest a large
sum to lend the project an appearance of credibility then withdraw
their capital as they approach their goal. 149 The classic fraudulent
offering involves an issuer who accepts investments for a fictitious
project and disappears after the offering closes. 50 Further, over 90

See id. (quoting Brian Korn, Securities Attorney, Pepper Hamilton).
142.
143.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 217; see also Judy Magness, Defeating
Crowdfunding Fraud, SUIT (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.thesuitmagazine.com/business/
finance/22127-defeating-crowdfunding-fraud.html ("The sort of fraud we see in this area is often
totally inadvertent, where somebody doesn't realize that what they are saying cannot be said
Entrepreneurs need to understand exactly
without explaining the background behind it ....
what their obligations are." (quoting Sara Hanks, founder of CrowdCheck & former partner at
Clifford Chance)).
144.
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427, 66,550 (to be codified at 17 CFR §227.502).
145.
See Hazen, supra note 44, at 1759.
See Mark Norych, Comment No. 247 to Proposed Rules on the JOBS Act Title III,
146.
SEC.GOV
(July
19,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-247.pdf
(suggesting that the most appropriate forum for crowdfunding disputes is Internet arbitration,
considering the costs of travel relative to the meager potential award).
147.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148.
See Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus, Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The
Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter 2 (UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper No. 2013-15,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2234765.
149.
Id.; Agrawal et al., supranote 22, at 30.
See, e.g., Julianne Pepitone, Kickstarter Pulls Plug on Scam Minutes Before
150.
MONEY (June
17, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
$120,000 Heist, CNN
(documenting
a
fraudulent
2013/06/17/technology/kickstarter-scam-kobe-jerky/index.html
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percent of creators propose only one crowdfunded project, so even bona
fide issuers are typically unproven commodities.151
But outright fraud constitutes less than 5 percent of
crowdfunded projects, 152 so the more realistic concern for investors is
that issuers might fail to exert a good faith effort to make their project
a success. 153 Once the money is in the issuer's hands, funders exhibit
very little control over the use of those proceeds because they have no
voting power and cannot sell their shares in a secondary market. 154
Their position is analogous to a shareholder in a closely held
corporation, where there is high potential for oppression. 155 The
ongoing reporting requirements provide some manner of oversight,
but funders would have to result to litigation if they are unsatisfied
with their investment, which is not an economically efficient
solution.156
Research on nonequity crowdfunding shows that signals from
issuers related to quality and preparedness exert considerable
influence over investment decisions. 157 These signals include posting
a video on the portal page, providing rapid and continuous updates on
funding goals, minimizing typos, social network size, patent
ownership, founders with success in other ventures, and the founders'
education level.15 8 Outside of the crowdfunding context, eBay and
Amazon's rating systems demonstrate the crowds' power to influence
Internet investment decisions. 159

campaign to produce Kobe Red beef jerky, which nearly succeeded in scamming 3,300 investors
out of $120,000 before Kickstarter pulled the project off its website).
151.
See Kuppuswamy & Bayus, supra note 148 at 9.
152.
See Mollick, supra note 21, at 11; see also Waters, supra note 128 (noting that,
according to IndieGoGo CEO Slava Rubin, fraud accounts for less than 1 percent of money raised
on Indiegogo).
153.
See Davidoff, supra note 12 (chronicling The Doom That Came to Atlantis, a board
game that raised $122,000 preselling versions of the game, which the founder spent to move to
Portland, Oregon before declaring the project unsuccessful).
154.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 54; see Davidoff, supra note 12.
155.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 54.
156.
See supra note 136.
157.
This phenomenon-high-quality projects attract backers who may promote the
project to other potential backers, or external media, thus increasing the draw of the project-is
called the Matthew Effect. See Mollick, supra note 21, at 6, 8 ("In a setting where amateurs are
making decisions about which projects to finance, and taking into account the social networks
that would tend to be sources of both funding and endorsements, the effect of these signals of
quality and preparedness is unexpectedly large.").
158.
See id. at 8; Waters, supra note 128; Pepitone, supranote 150.
159.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 58; Waters, supranote 128.
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D. Unique Characteristicsof Portals
As a matter of cost shifting, portals can shoulder the burden of
Portals employ a revenue model that
policing crowdfunding. 160
charges a transaction fee of four to five percent for all successfully
funded projects, which could generate up to $200-250 million in
In addition, if trends in other
annual revenues for portals. 161
crowdfunding markets translate to the equity-based market, a single
platform will ultimately establish market dominance. 162 The value of
the platform to creators increases with the number of funders, and
vice versa, thus each platform has a strong market incentive to attract
high-quality projects, reduce fraud, and facilitate the efficient
allocation of capital to the best ideas. 163 More importantly, as most
project founders only participate in one crowdfunded project, placing
too much of the regulatory burden on issuers might deter them from
bringing their project to the market. 16 4 Therefore, portals are in the
best position to incur up-front regulatory costs, amass pertinent
information from both investors and issuers, and then spread those
6
costs and benefits among all market participants. 5
With that said, prohibiting portals from screening issuers does
a great disservice to investors. 6 6 Intermediaries are tasked with
implementing controls to detect fraudulent offerings. 167 This includes

One commenter noted:
160.
[A]s the [portals] whose business expressly involves interjecting ourselves into the
middle of the financial system, of registering with the SEC and joining an SRO, of
dealing with crowdfunding on a daily basis, it is only natural that we should shoulder
the regulatory burden for this new crowdfunding regime. Were [sic] the ones who
should be digging into the code and the rules, working with our lawyers to develop a
platform that is fully compliant [sic] were [sic] the ones who should be responsible for
ensuring that the system is sustainable, and that investors are protected.
Fleenor, supra note 115.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 15 (computing 4-5 percent (the typical portal
161.
commission fee), times $5 billion (one projected market estimate) to equal $200-250 million).
162.
See id.
See id. at 16.
163.
164.
The same commenter explained with concern:
If the SEC heavily burdens the intermediaries, it may force some participants out of
the market, but there will be players willing to incur the extra burdens - we believe
the supply of intermediary services will be adequate in any event. However, if the
SEC over-burdens issuers and/or investors, there is a very real possibility that
demand for crowdfunding will be choked off, and our small businesses will not obtain
the capital they need to grow. The capital markets are failing our small businesses, to
the detriment of our under-employed citizenry. Congress recognized this failure, and
passed the JOBS Act in an attempt to rectify the situation.
Fleenor, supra note 115.
165.
See id.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 19.
166.
167.
Intermediaries are obliged to "take such measures to reduce the risk of fraud with
respect to such transactions, as established by the Commission, by rule .... " See Crowdfunding,
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performing basic background checks and securities-enforcement
regulatory-history checks on all relevant members of the issuer's
management team. 168 The rules currently prohibit portals from
offering "investment advice or recommendations."' 169 This language is
ambiguous and, if broadly construed, might preclude portals from
screening projects with a high potential for fraud or failure. 170 While
there may be wisdom in prohibiting portals from offering investment
advice, sites such as SeedInvest are extremely successful in
preventing fraudulent projects from reaching their investors but do so
by filtering out 98 percent of proposed projects. 17 1 This evidence
strengthens the argument that equity-based platforms stand to
benefit from at least a basic project screening process. 172 Decreased
incidences of fraud will increase trust in the crowdfunding market,
leading to the optimal allocation of capital. 173 Hence, it is preferable
to empower intermediaries to pre-screen projects, even if this
174
increases the average cost of an offering.
E. Crowdfunding: The InferiorAlternative
Ultimately, crowdfunding's problem is this-who will use it? It
is plausible that the crown jewel of the JOBS Act will ultimately be
Title II,175 which lifted the ban on general solicitation and advertising
1 76
of private placement offerings utilizing the Regulation D exemption.
Perhaps it will be Title I, which equipped emerging growth companies
with an arsenal of tools (such as 'testing the waters ' 17 7) for conducting
78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,461 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232,
239, 240, and 249).
See id.
168.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 220.
169.
170.
See id.
See Segarra, supra note 122.
171.
172.
See Segarra, supra note 122; Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 22.
173.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 936.
174.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 19.
175.
Known as 'Accredited Investor Crowdfunding.' Accredited Investor Crowdfunding
Platforms:

A

Brief

History,

CROWDSOURCING.ORG

(Mar.

25,

2014,

5:36PM),

http://www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/accredited-investor-crowdfunding.platformsa -briefhistory/31099.
176.
Regulation D is a separate exemption from SEC registration requirements. Id.
While the JOBS Act permits general solicitation & advertising of Reg. D offers, only qualifying
accredited investors may actually purchase the securities. See JOBS Act § 201 et. seq., 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d (2012); see Bradford, supra note 20, at 222.
Testing-the-waters meetings enable issuers to communicate with prospective
177.
investors prior to an offering in order to gauge investor interest and disseminate pertinent
information to interested investors. See Tracy Cooley, JOBS Act Deconstructed: Testing-thehttp://www.biotech-now.orgfbusiness-and(Oct.
14,
2013),
BIOTECHNOW
Waters,
investments/2013/10/jobs-act-deconstructed-testing-the-waters; LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, THE
JOBS ACT AFTER ONE YEAR: A REVIEW OF THE NEW IPO PLAYBOOK 6-7 (Apr. 5, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-091713-lathamreport-slides.pdf.
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successful IPOs. 178 Offerings relying on the crowdfunding exemption,
by contrast, are not permitted to advertise beyond providing a link
179
that directs investors to the platform.
Importantly, start-ups and small businesses conducting
offerings in reliance on Regulation D circumvent costly disclosure
requirements by allowing issuers to simply open their books to
potential investors. 8 0 This is especially attractive to IP-intensive
projects, as they do not have to expose potentially sensitive
information to the general public or competitors.' 8 ' These companies
would not have to file with the SEC, nor place their offering through a
8 2
registered intermediary.
The most attractive aspect of Regulation D, however, is that it
allows offerors to raise an unlimited amount of money without
restricting the amount each individual investor can purchase. 8 3 This
is a potential deal breaker for founders whom are choosing among
financing alternatives, as crowdfunding's high compliance expenses
compared to the low maximum investment total provide perhaps the
84
worst "bang for your buck" in corporate finance.1
Further, founders might use nonequity forms of crowdfunding
to raise seed capital while signaling the quality of their project to
bigger investors and receiving constructive feedback from the crowd.
Thus, they avoid equity-crowdfunding altogether and are more
attractive for follow-on financing from established investors whom
provide status, extensive networks, and industry expertise. 8 5 It is
also possible that some companies soliciting purely intrastate
investment will take advantage of Direct Public Offerings, an
increasingly popular trend in the start-up community. 8 6 With several
178.
The report also lists: (1) Confidential SEC Review; (2) Scaled Financial Disclosure;
(3) Internal Controls Audit; (4) Executive Compensation Disclosure; (5) Extended Phase-In for
New GAAP; and (6) PCAOB Rules as mechanisms Title I permits an EGC to utilize. JOBS Act
After One Year, supra note 177, at 5.
179.
See Jacobs, supra note 101.
180.
See id.
181.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 16.
182.
See Segarra, supra note 122.
183.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 222.
184.
See Jacobs, supra note 101.
185.
An additional benefit of using nonequity crowdfunding for the initial financing
round is avoiding dilution, thereby making the company more attractive in follow-on financing
rounds. See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 7.
186.
See Jenny Kassa, The JOBS Act Leaves Crowdfunding Investors Unprotected-the
SEC is Working with a Flawed Law, VENTURE BEAT (Oct. 31, 2013, 6:19 AM),
http://venturebeat.com/20 13/10/31/the-jobs-act-leaves-crowdfunding-investors-unprotected-thesec-is-working-with-a-flawed-law. The appeal of these offerings is clear:
In a typical initial public offering, a Wall Street underwriter markets shares to
wealthy clients and institutional investors, taking a cut of the proceeds. In a direct
offering, shares are marketed directly by the issuing company, typically to customers,
supporters and, these days, social media followers. The companies may advertise the
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more attractive financing options for quality investments,
crowdfunding may become a market for projects that could not
arrange financing elsewhere unless the Commission makes significant
187
alterations to the proposed rules.

III. A COMPROMISE: LOWERING BARRIERS TO ENTRY WITHOUT
SACRIFICING INVESTOR PROTECTION

When Congress inserted a blunderbuss clause in the JOBS Act,
they empowered the Commission to supplement the statutory text
with "such other requirements as the Commission may, by rule,
prescribe for the protection of investors and in the public interest."' 8 8
This could, and should, be interpreted as permission to experiment
with the crowdfunding market.18 9 Crowdfunding raises a host of novel
legal questions to which there are no concrete solutions. Thus, the
legislation permits, and the market demands, a trail-and-error
approach to regulation.1 90
It is important to remember that the Securities Act is not an
insurance policy against investor losses. 19 1 Crowdfunding's pitfalls
are well documented: increased fraud potential from relaxed
disclosure requirements coupled with the Internet's tendency to
encourage irrational decision making. 192 The actions of portals in

offering freely and accept funds from an unlimited number of unaccredited, or
nonwealthy, investors. And the companies are not subject to the quarterly reporting
requirements and comprehensive registration process that come with an initial
offering.
• . .A direct offering might cost around $25,000 in legal fees, while a formal initial
public offering can cost $1 million or more.
Amy Cortese, Seeking Capital, Some Companies Turn to 'Do-It-Yourself L.P.O.'s,' N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/Ollbusiness/smallbusiness/seeking-capital-somecompanies-turn-to-do-it-yourself-ipos.html.
187.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 36.
188.
E.g. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 61.
189.
For example, a number of commentators insist the SEC has the power to raise the
maximum offering amount and doing so would create a more viable market. See, e.g., Albert
Hartman, Comment No. 79 to Proposed Rules on the JOBS Act Title III, SEC.GOV (June 4, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iiijobstitleiii-79.htm; Robert B. Nami, Comment No. 81 to
Proposed Rules
on
the JOBS
Act
Title
III, SEC.GOV
(June
5,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-81.htm (stating a minimum of $5-10
million is necessary to start any business other than software); Richard W. Marks, Comment No.
87 to Proposed Rules on the JOBS Act Title III, SEC.GOV (June 14, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iiiljobstitleiii-87.htm (advocating raising the maximum
offering amount to $5 million); Peter Ojo, Comment No. 76 to Proposed Rules on the JOBS Act
Title III, SEC.GOv (May 31, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iiiljobstitleiii-76.htm
(arguing crowdfunding's maximum offering amount should be similar to Regulation D); Davidoff,
supra note 12.
190.
See Gubler, supra note 10.
191.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 934.
192.
See id. at 934, 937.
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the
that
suggest
however,
crowdfunding,
nonequity
equity-crowdfunding market will likely remedy many of its own
problems if portals are free to innovate. 193 So long as the market
produces a net value-add (i.e., facilitates greater incremental business
creation than incremental fraud increase) crowdfunding will be a
success. 194 Crowdfunding will not add value if burdensome regulation
195
prevents many promising projects from reaching the market.
Accordingly, the Commission should treat the market with a light
1 96
regulatory touch.
The Commission should take advantage of Congress' broad
delegation to regulate the crowdfunding market by making significant
deviations from their proposed rules when promulgating final
regulations. Crowdfunding is intended to attract a different type of
company than traditional securities markets and, consequently,
different investors. 97
Considering the participants, the market
requires a unique regulatory structure. 198 Yet, the Commission
resorted to old tactics.1 99 In the final rules, the Commission should
relax disclosure requirements, enable portals to prescreen projects,
and eliminate restrictions on the crowd's ability to communicate.
A. Simplifying DisclosureRequirements
An appropriate crowdfunding exemption should drastically
reduce disclosure requirements given the lack of reliable information
and the low maximum offering amount relative to other financing
alternatives. 20 0 Regulation should not discourage companies from
listing their projects on portals, because a diversified mix of projects
increases the probability of profitable investment. 20 1 Burdensome
disclosure requirements directly frustrate this goal. 20 2
Simple

193.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 31 (noting how nonequity platforms almost
uniformly converged on a provision-point mechanism-not disbursing funds unless a project
reaches its funding threshold-absent any regulatory prodding).
194.
See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 940-45.
195.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
196.
See Schwartz, supra note 9.
197.
See The JOBS Act: Economic Boon or Peril?, supra note 1 ('The goal of the JOBS
Act is to have more companies fail faster . . . . This isn't a side effect, this is really the main effect
of improving the startup economy: getting more people to try more ideas, which inherently
means more failure. But it also means more experience, it means more surprises, it means lower
cost. In a way, the criminogenic argument seems to me to get halfway towards what the JOBS
Act is actually targeted for in that it recognizes this lowering of the threshold to participationbut [the JOBS Act] also lowers the cost of participation." (quoting Clay Shirky)).
198.
See Davidoff, supra note 12.
199.
Id.
200.
See supra Part II.B.
201.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 16.
202.
See supra Part II.B.
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disclosure requirements would allow issuers to highlight the
important aspects of the investment, such as the price and percentage
of ownership. 20 3
Because of the unsophisticated nature of
crowdfunding investors and the infancy of crowdfunded businesses,
issuers should be required to explain who they are, what they seek to
produce, their basic business plan, current financial condition
(focusing on definite liabilities), the intended purpose of the funds, and
what the investor receives from their investment (i.e. ownership stake,
voting rights, etc... ).204
The relatively small maximum offering amount does not justify
extensive disclosure. 20 5 The final version of Form C should be
significantly less complex than the current iteration, providing
issuer's with the simple disclosure process they desire. 20 6 Ideally,
issuers could complete Form C by selecting from a database of stock
responses, rather than paying professionals to compile their
disclosures. Additionally, if the final regulations include a "testing the
waters" provision with crowdfunding-appropriate modifications, 207
then issuers could make informed decisions about where to set their
target offering amount or whether they should avoid an unsuccessful
208
offering altogether.
The tiered-disclosure requirement should mimic Regulation D,
where entrepreneurs have the option of providing only an audited
balance sheet if obtaining fully audited financial statements would
require "unreasonable effort or expense." 20 9 It is fair to say that
spending over 10 percent of the total amount raised on audited
statements constitutes an unreasonable expense. 2 10
Providing a
203.
See Jonathan Schatz, Comment No. 53 to Proposed Regulations on Crowdfunding,
SEC.GOV (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-53.htm.
204.
See Robert C. Guinto, Jr., Comment No. 13 to Proposed Regulations on
Crowdfunding, SEC.GOV (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-13.htm.
205.
Regulation A offerings were capped at $5 million before recent changes by JOBS Act
Title IV allowed Regulation A offerings to issue as much as $50 million of equity, subject to more
stringent reporting requirements. See Dave Lynn, SEC Proposes Long-Awaited Regulation A+
Rules,
CORPORATE
COUNSEL
(Dec.
19,
2013),
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/
Blog/2013/12/sec-proposes-long-awaited-regulation-a-rules.html.
206.
Examples of a scaled-down disclosure document include Form 1-A (before JOBS Act
modifications) or NASAA's 1989 Form U-7. See Guinto, supra note 204. Ideally, Form C will be
less detailed than either of these examples, in proportion to crowdfunding's relatively low
maximum offering amount. Id.
207.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text. For example, allowing issuers to conduct
a survey of potential investors regarding their level of interest in the project and potential
investment commitment; or, allowing investors to make a commitment contingent on more
detailed disclosure.
208.
See Fleenor, supra note 115 ("If issuers could, at a low cost, obtain some confidence
that their raise will be successful, they may be more inclined to spend their literal bottom dollar
on the legal and accounting fees necessary to undertake a crowdfunding offering.").
209.
Regulation D § 502(b)(2)(B) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)).
210.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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balance sheet, though, will warn investors of the company's existing
financial obligations (if any), which pose a major impediment to
profitable investment.
Minimizing disclosure requirements increases the risks for
investors. 211 Therefore, to maintain sufficient investor safeguards, the
Commission should require portals to actively confirm that investors
do not exceed their annual investment limitation.
The annual
investment limitation functions as the fundamental investor
protection in crowdfunding. 212 The proposed rules allow investors to
self-certify their level of wealth and investment activity, 2 13 but the
unique dynamics of crowdfunding demand a stricter oversight process.
As it currently stands, the self-certification procedure is too easy for
investors to circumvent when they discover a "can't miss" project, but
an additional investment would exceed their annual limit. 2 14 A
competently managed portal can hire third-party providers to verify
individuals' investment sums, and then distribute these costs among
21 5
market participants.
B. PortalPre-ScreeningPower
The proposed rules prohibit portals from offering "investment
recommendations or advice." 21 6
The SEC should clarify what
constitutes a recommendation or advice to exclude internal
pre-screening decisions. As for-profit concerns, portals have a market
incentive to permit as many quality projects as possible to solicit
investments on their site. Rewards-based crowdfunding suggests the
market will come to be dominated by a single platform, 21 7 and portals
operate on a model where they receive the majority of their profit from
successfully funded ventures. 218 It is in their interest to ensure the

211.
212.
213.

See Hazen, supra note 44, at 1763.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 60.
Self-certification is customary for most securities offerings. See Bradford, supranote

20.
214.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 60.
215.
Third party service providers will race to fill this space. For example, an Ohio
startup, Crowdentials Inc., recently launched an investor accreditation verification product in
response to JOBS Act Title II's allowing general solicitation. See Lora Kolodny, Crowdentials
Wants to Make Investor Verification 'TurboTax Easy' Online, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2014,
2:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/01/13/crowdentials-wants-to-make-investorverification-turbotax-easy-online.
216.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427, 66435 (proposed Jan. 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 240, and 249).
217.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 3.
218.
Id. at 16.
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platform offers attractive projects to funders in order to build a loyal
base of investors, which in turn attracts more quality projects. 2 19
Kickstarter recently adopted a pre-screening process to
maximize transaction volume. 220 After undergoing a trial-and-error
process, its management believes the benefit of reducing risk for
funders outweigh the monitoring costs. 221 Likewise, the SEC should
grant equity-based crowdfunding portals similar discretion to
pre-screen offerings for fraud. 222 To achieve this end, portals can hire
investment professionals to evaluate proposed projects, thereby
submitting only bona fide projects to investors. 223 In this way,
investors will gain trust in the market and rely more on the wisdom of
224
the crowd to discern promising investments.
In addition to fraudulent offerings, portals should be permitted
to filter out impractical projects. 225 For example, Kickstarter changed
their guidelines to impose more stringent requirements for Hardware
and Product Design projects after discovering they had a higher
propensity to fail when they consisted solely of renderings or product
simulations as opposed to an actual prototype. 22 6 Additionally, some
projects require far in excess of $1 million to complete. 227 Ultimately,

219.
Id.
220.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 25 ("These efforts are focused on fraud and
acceptable uses of Kickstarter, not a creator's ability to complete a project and fulfill. On
Kickstarter, backers ultimately decide the validity and worthiness of a project by whether they
decide to fund it.").
221.
Id. ("For example, Kickstarter recently allocated additional resources to detect
fraud, implying that its management believes the benefits of doing so (lower risk for funders)
outweigh the costs (increased monitoring costs for the platform and higher disclosure burden on
creators.").
222.
Compare SEED INVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/about (last visited Mar. 20,
2014) ("We are not a listing service. We only feature highly vetted investment opportunities that
adhere to strict requirements."), with Beth Potter, Funding Launchpad Changes Name, Focus,
BOULDER COUNTY Bus. REP. (Aug. 22,
2013,
2:10 PM),
http://www.bcbr.com/
article/20130822/NEWS/130829972 ("Investments listed on the Grofolio.com website all will be
vetted by an investment bank ...").
223.
See Segarra, supranote 122.
224.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 22 ('Traditional markets for the financing of
early-stage creative projects or ventures rely heavily on due diligence predicated on face-to-face
interactions and personal relationships. In the crowdfunding setting, creators disclose as much
information as they wish and then rely on an ethos of 'trust me.' Market design may influence
the efficacy of a 'trust me' environment by facilitating markets for reputation. In other words, in
crowdfunding markets, as in many other online markets, reputation and trust are particularly
important.").
225.
See Perry Chen, Yancey Strickler, & Charles Adler, FAQ: Guidelines for Hardware
and Product Design Projects, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com/
blog/faq-guidelines-for-hardware-and-product-design-pro.
226.
See Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 19, 25-26; Perry Chen, Yancey Strickler, &
Charles Adler, Kickstarter Is Not a Store, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.kickstarter.comlblog/kickstarter-is-not-a-store.
227.

See

e.g.,

Oculus

Rift:

Step

Into

the

Game,

KICKSTARTER.COM,

https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1523379957/oculus-rift-step-into-the.game (last visited Apr.
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the viability of a project should hinge on whether crowdfunders invest,
but portals can add value and build trust by removing projects that
clearly have no chance of success, yet might appear legitimate enough
228
to attract investment.
C. Collective Crowd Consensus
Crowdfunding can distinguish itself from traditional sources of
capital by leveraging the "wisdom of the crowd"229 and its critical role
in protecting investors from fraudulent crowdfunded projects. 230 By
providing open communication channels, portals allow the community
of investors to share their knowledge, ranging from information about
the founders to industry-wide risks, collectively arriving at an
If communication channels are
ostensibly rational decision.2 3 1
sufficiently open to allow for the free flow of information among the
crowd, the heavy lifting in making investment decisions-filtering out
the best projects and limiting fraud-will be spread among the crowd,
232
rather than subject to the diligence of each individual.
Though the locus of crowdfunding regulation is on the general
lack of sophistication of crowdfunding investors, the fact is that
'sophisticated' investors don't necessarily enjoy superior returns on
their investments. 233 Since the beginning of 1994, the performance of
major hedge funds is nearly identical to the annual returns on the
S&P 500.234 Ultimately the purpose of regulation is to ensure
investors are sufficiently informed, not to ensure a successful

11, 2014) (showing the origins of the Oculus Rift virtual reality headset, which raised over $2.4
million on Kickstarter to develop a prototype before Facebook acquired the rights for over $2
billion).
See, e.g., Agrawal et al., supra note 22, at 20-21; see also Bryan Taylor, How John
228.
Keely Screwed Investors and Tricked the World with His Perpetual Motion Machine, Bus.
INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/john-keelys-perpetual-motionmachine-2013-12 (chronicling how the purported inventor John Keely raised over $5 million for
research & development of a "etheric generator" perpetual motion machine, without ever
delivering a finished product, or even a prototype, to investors before his death in 1898).
229.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 219-20 ("[T]he idea that 'even if most of the people
within a group are not especially well-informed or rational . . . [the group] can still reach a
collectively wise decision."').
See Mollick, supra note 21, at 7; see also Little Monster Productions, Mythic: The
230.
Story of Gods and Men, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/273246798/mythicthe-story-of-gods-and-men/comments (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (exemplifying how an active
crowd can expose a fraudulent issuer).
231.
See Bradford, supra note 20, at 219-20.
232.
See Waters, supra note 128.
See Walter Kurtz & Sober Look, The 20-Year Performance of Hedge Funds and the
233.
2013,
8:43 AM),
(Aug.
12,
S&P 500 Are Almost Identical, Bus. INSIDER
http://www.businessinsider.comlhedge-funds-and-sp-500-nearly-identica-2013-8.
234.
See id. (asserting that both the CS Hedge Fund Index and S&P 500 have returned
8.6 percent annually over the last twenty years).
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investment. 235 Extensive disclosure is especially unnecessary in
crowdfunding given that it is almost entirely speculative information
at the start-up stage, thus easy to distort. 236 For crowdfunded
projects, the pertinent information is accessible on the Internet and
the crowd is unlikely to successfully fund a project if sufficient
237
information to make an informed investment is not available.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to unduly burden issuers with extensive
disclosure when the crowd can freely disseminate information.
IV. CONCLUSION

Crowdfunding carries the potential to unleash a vast store of
previously inaccessible capital into the US economy, enabling a new
wave of entrepreneurs to achieve the American Dream. The only way
this market will realize its full potential is if the SEC implements an
innovative regulatory framework befitting a novel market.
The
proposed rules, as they currently stand, advance a market that has
little chance to succeed. In order to create a viable market, the final
regulations
should
relax
disclosure
requirements,
while
simultaneously empowering portals to pre-screen offerings and the
crowd to disseminate pertinent information. As it is operating in
uncharted territory, the Commission would do well to adopt a
trial-and-error approach to regulation. If the Commission can strike
the proper balance of protecting investors without imposing
prohibitive costs on issuers, then investors will allocate capital to the
most promising projects, achieving an optimal market.
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See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 934.
See Guinto, supra note 204.
See Ahlers et al., supranote 7, at 18.
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